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In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis the role of strongly interconnected markets in fostering
systemic instability has been increasingly acknowledged. Trade networks of commodities are suscep-
tible to deleterious cascades of supply shocks that increase systemic trade-risks and pose a threat to
geopolitical stability. On a global and a regional level we show that supply risk, scarcity, and price
volatility of non-fuel mineral resources are intricately connected with the structure of the world-trade
network of or spanned by these resources. On the global level we demonstrate that the scarcity of
a resource, as measured by its trade volume compared to extractable reserves, is closely related
to the susceptibility of the trade network with respect to cascading shocks. On the regional level
we find that to some extent the region-specific price volatility and supply risk can be understood
by centrality measures that capture systemic trade-risk. The resources associated with the highest
systemic trade-risk indicators are often those that are produced as byproducts of major metals. We
identify significant shortcomings in the management of systemic trade-risk, in particular in the EU.
Commodity price volatility has long been identified
by political economists as a hindrance for sustainable eco-
nomic development (e.g., the Dutch Disease) as well as
a catalyst and product of geopolitical crises. Although
traditionally associated with fossil fuel resources, the crit-
icality of non-fuel mineral resources is increasingly rele-
vant due to their use in cutting edge technological and
medical applications [1]. With the explosive growth of fi-
nancial derivatives on commodities and a subsequent in-
vestment boom and bust in the mid 2000s, there is grow-
ing evidence that resource criticality, loosely defined as
the importance of a resource to production processes, is
increasingly susceptible to financial perturbations both,
from within and outside the commodities sector [2, 3].
A better understanding of the interconnected nature of
commodity markets would allow policymakers to hedge
against threats to industrial sectors and to reduce risk
of geopolitical instabilities that are induced by resource
price volatility.
Systemic risk is often defined as the risk that a large
fraction of a system collapses as a consequence of seem-
ingly minor and local shocks that initially only affect a
small part of the system. Due to the interconnectedness
of the system these shocks may cause secondary effects
that eventually propagate through the entire network.
Awareness of systemic risk has greatly increased in the
finance literature in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis
[4, 5]. For financial systems it has been shown that sys-
temic risk is to a large extent a network effect [6]. There
external shocks to a single financial institution may result
in a sudden reduction of financial flows to other institu-
tions which causes distress for them as well. This chain
of reduced financial flows can spread through the system,
can lead to positive feedback dynamics, and may end in
a strong reduction of the total net worth of financial in-
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stitutions [7]. It has been shown that the vulnerability
of a system to such cascading shocks can be assessed by
network centrality measures and related concepts [8–11].
It is becoming increasingly clear that security of sup-
ply can only be understood in a framework that acknowl-
edges the global interconnections among resource systems
[12, 13]. In this work we show that the likelihood of price
disruptions in mineral prices is strongly related to the
structure of the trade network of the particular resource.
We introduce a novel method to assess the systemic risk
of trade networks and demonstrate its validity on the ac-
tual trade networks of 71 resources. On a global level
we show that the scarcity of a resource is strongly re-
lated to structural properties of the trade networks. The
scarcer the resource, the more susceptible to cascading
shocks is the trade network. On a regional level we show
that the volatility of mineral prices within several world
regions, in particular the US and the EU, is closely re-
lated to specific network centrality measures that we de-
sign to capture systemic trade-risk. We find that price
disruptions of mineral resources also reflect cascades of
supply shocks in the underlying trade network. The im-
pact of these cascades can to some extent be mitigated
by lowering trade barriers. We find the highest systemic
trade-risk for resources that are primarily produced as
byproducts of other resources. It has been argued that
these resources are especially prone to price disruptions
since it is hard to predict whether their global supply will
react to changes in global demand [14].
I. ‘TRADERISK’: AN INDICATOR FOR
SYSTEMIC TRADE-RISK
We work with 71 non-fuel mineral resources as pro-
vided by the US Geological Survey (USGS) in the Min-
eral commodity summaries [15]. For each of these re-
sources (r) we construct the network of international
cross-border trade flows Mrij(t). The result is a so-called
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2FIG. 1: The world-wide trade-risk network for non-fuel minerals, represented as a multiplex trade network V rij(t), where each
layer corresponds to one mineral resource, (A) copper, (B) lithium, and (C) platinum group metals. We study the network
topology of each of these layers and compute both regional (node-based, i.e. country-specific) and global (network-based)
measures. We study the relationships between supply risk, price volatility, network centrality, and trade barriers for the US
and EU (world regions highlighted in green in the world map).
multiplex network where nodes (i, j) represent countries
that are connected by different types of links (r) that
represent trade in different commodities. The entries in
Mrij(t) represent the amount of resource r in USD that
flows from country i to country j within year t. Details
on how Mrij(t) is extracted from the data are discussed
in section IV A.
The vulnerability to supply shocks in mineral imports
of countries has a strong geopolitical component. Im-
ports from countries that are politically unstable are
more prone to supply restrictions than imports from
countries that are politically stable [16]. The indica-
tor ‘Political Stability and Absence of Violence’, PSi(t),
measures the likelihood of political, social or economic
distress in country i in year t [17]. PSi(t) ranges from
zero to hundred. High values indicate high political sta-
bility. The network-based vulnerability of country j to
import shortages of mineral r, due to supply restrictions
from another country i, is given by the trade-risk multi-
plex network V rij(t), defined as
V rij(t) =
(
1− PSi(t)100
) Mrij(t)∑
iM
r
ij(t)
. (1)
V rij(t) is the fraction of country j’s imports of commodity
r from i, in year t, weighted by how likely country i ex-
periences political or social disturbances. The trade-risk
vulnerability network V rij(t) is shown for copper, lithium,
and platinum group metals in figure 1. As an alternative
to the Political Stability indicator we also use the Re-
source Governance Index RGIi instead of PSi(t). RGIi
measures the quality of governance in the oil, gas and
mining sectors on a scale from zero to hundred [18].
Imagine a country that receives its imports from a large
number of politically stable countries, but those coun-
tries all rely on imports from a single, politically unsta-
ble country. Clearly, any measure for supply risk that
is only based on trade flows with direct neighbors in the
trade network does not take such situations into account.
These influences can be quantified by recursive centrality
measures, for example the PageRank [19]. The PageR-
ank PRri (t) of country i in the trade-risk network for
resource r at time t is given by solutions to the recursive
equation
PRri (t) = α
∑
j
1
krout,j(t)
V rij(t)PR
r
j (t) + (1− α) , (2)
of the PageRank, where krout,j(t) is the out-degree (num-
ber of countries into which r is exported) of j. Those
countries pass the shock on to the countries that receive
exports from them, and so on. The parameter (1−α) can
be understood as the contribution to supply shocks due
to effects that are not related to the trade-risk network.
Note that equation 2 only converges for α < 1λr(t) , where
λr(t) is the largest eigenvalue of V r. We adopt the stan-
dard convention by setting α ≡ α(r, t) = 0.85λr(t) [19]. Here
3we then take a time average PRri = 〈PRri (t)〉t, where
〈·〉t denotes the average over the years 2000-2012. PRri
is a measure for how likely country i is affected by supply
shocks in any other country, even when there is no direct
trade relation between those countries. A potential shock
in country j will be distributed in units of 1krout,j(t)
to all
countries that receive exports from j, where
Countries will only be vulnerable to changes in their
imports of mineral r if they have a non-zero import re-
liance IRri . The IR
r
i quantifies how strongly the economy
in country i depends on imports of resource r, see section
IV B. Finally, we arrive at the network-based impact of
supply shocks in resource r for country i, the TradeRisk
TRri , which is given by
TRri = PR
r
i IR
r
i . (3)
For each network layer in V rij(t) we study the following
indicators, averaged over the years 2000-2012. The av-
erage degree k¯r is the average number of non-zero links
per node for a given resource r. SCCr is the number
of nodes that are part of the largest strongly connected
component, divided by the number of nodes in the net-
work. The SCC is the largest subset of nodes where each
node can be reached on the network from every other
node. The largest eigenvalue, λr, of V r is a measure for
how susceptible the trade-risk network V r is to epidemic
spreading processes. The smaller λr, the easier it is for a
small shock to propagate through the entire network [20].
In this sense 1/λr can be seen as a measure for resilience
of the network. The scarcity Sr of a commodity r is de-
fined as the logarithmic quotient of the total trade volume
and the estimated reserves, Sr = log(TTV r/Rr). Re-
sults for several indicator values for individual resources
are given in the supplement in table S.III.
We define the adjacency multiplex Brij(t) = 1, if
V rij(t) > 0 from equation 1, and B
r
ij(t) = 0 otherwise.
The in-degree of country j, krin,j , is given by k
r
in,j =
〈∑iBrij(t)〉t. krin,j is the number of countries that con-
tribute to at least one percent of i’s total imports of min-
eral r, averaged over all available years. The in-strength
wrin,j for country j is given by w
r
in,j = 〈
∑
i V
r
ij(t)〉t. Note
that wrin,j can be seen as a weighted average of the po-
litical stability of the countries that export r to i. The
weights are the fractions of i’s total imports in r that the
particular countries j provide. We consider an alterna-
tive formulation of the TradeRisk indicator by replacing
the PageRank PRri with the in-strength w
r
in,i in equation
1, the In-Strength TradeRisk TR
str,(r)
i = w
r
in,iIR
r
i .
For testing our results for significance of network ef-
fects, we will employ several randomized versions of
the data, see also section IV C. In the first randomiza-
tion, Mrfix degree(t), we keep the average degree k¯
r fixed
and each trade flow gets a randomly selected import-
ing and exporting country. The second randomization,
Mrfix in-deg(t), randomizes the exporting country for each
trade flow, but keeps the importing country fixed. In
the third randomization, Mrfix in-/out-deg(t), the importing
and exporting countries are fixed but randomly permutes
the values of the non-zero trade flows.
II. RESULTS
A. Global results: resilience and trade networks
We find that the composite supply risk CSRr has a
weak negative correlation with the largest eigenvalue λr
of V r (Pearson correlation coefficient ρ = −0.32, p-value
of p = 0.026), see table I. CSRr is also negatively cor-
related with the size of the strongly connected compo-
nent, SCCr (ρ = −0.41, p = 0.0039). A high production
concentration may indicate a small strongly connected
component and consequently an increased supply risk.
Both, the largest eigenvalue λr and the SCCr show a
significant correlation with the scarcity Sr. The scarcer
a resource, the less resilient the trade-risk network to
supply shocks, and the higher the largest eigenvalue λr
(ρ = 0.47, p = 0.0011). These correlations are not con-
founded by the influence of the trading volume, TTV r,
itself, as seen by the non-significant correlations of λr
and SCCr with TTV r. The logarithmic average de-
gree log k¯r has only a negative correlation with resource
scarcity (ρ = 0.31, p = 0.041).
Results for the supply risk CSRr, scarcity Sr, and
trade volume TTV r for the randomized trade networks
Mrfix degree(t) are shown in the supporting information in
table S.IV. By construction the correlations of the aver-
age degree with both, the supply risk and scarcity of a re-
source are preserved under this randomization, see table
S.IV. However, there is no significant correlation of the
largest eigenvalue λr with the supply risk CSRr or the
scarcity Sr, respectively, in the randomized data. This
shows that resilience to cascading shocks as observed in
the real data is indeed a genuine network effect that can
not be explained by the size or number of trade flows
alone.
TABLE I: Global properties of the trade networks for each
resource r. The elements in the table the Pearson correlation
coefficients. The composite supply risk CSRr is negatively
correlated with the largest eigenvalue λr and the size of the
SCC. SCCr is positively correlated with both the total trad-
ing volume and the scarcity of the resource. The higher the
scarcity of the mineral, the lower the resilience to shocks of the
trade-risk network. These correlations can not be explained
by a potentially confounding influence of the trade volume
itself, as seen by the non-significant correlations of λr and
SCCr with TTV r. We indicate significance, p < 0.05, by (∗),
p < 0.01 by (∗∗), and p < 0.001 by (∗∗∗).
Correlation coefficient CSRr Sr TTV r
Largest Eigenvalue λr −0.32∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.21
Size SCC SCCr −0.41∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.05
4TABLE II: Regional results for the correlations of the TradeRisk indicators, price volatilities, and trade barriers. Price volatility
of mineral resources is best explained using the TradeRisk indicator for both the EU and US. There are also significant
correlations between price volatility and import reliance, PageRank, and In-Strength TradeRisk, respectively. The level of
applied protection (trade barriers) TBri is negatively correlated with TradeRisk in the US, but not in the EU.
Correlation with σrEU σ
r
US TB
r
EU TB
r
US
TradeRisk TRri 0.71
∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ −0.11 −0.39∗∗
Import Reliance IRri 0.48
∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ −0.15 −0.10
PageRank PRri 0.56
∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ −0.23 −0.43∗∗∗
In-Strength TradeRisk TRstr,ri 0.39
∗ 0.50∗∗∗ −0.12 −0.11
B. Region-specific results: price volatility and
network effects
Region-specific results are computed for the EU and
US. Results for the EU are obtained by condensing the 25
EU members of 2012 into a single node and by comput-
ing the TradeRisk, TRrEU , in the so-obtained network.
There is a highly significant correlation between price
volatility of the resource r in the EU, σrEU , and TradeRisk
(ρ = 0.71, p < 10−4), see figure 2(A). This correlation
is a genuine network effect. To show this we consider
an alternative formulation of the TradeRisk indicator by
replacing TRrEU with the In-Strength TradeRisk TR
str,r
EU
Table II shows that the TradeRisk TRrEU has a higher
correlation with price volatility than it has with any of
the other indicators, namely the import reliance IRrEU ,
the PageRank PRrEU , and the In-Strength TradeRisk
TRstr,rEU . To understand the impact of higher-order net-
work effects on volatility of resource prices, we study the
linear partial correlation, ρpartial, between TR
r
EU and
σrEU , controlling for the influence of TR
str,r
EU . The partial
correlation ρpartial can be interpreted as the amount of
variance in σrEU that can only be explained by knowledge
of the entire trade-risk network, after the influence of di-
rect neighbors in the network has been removed. We find
that ρpartial = 0.68 (p < 10
−4), which means that about
96% of the original correlation between price volatility
and TradeRisk (which was ρ = 0.71) can be attributed
to genuine network effects.
Basically the same observations also hold for the US,
see figure 2(B), where again the TradeRisk indicator ex-
plains price fluctuations, σrUS (ρ = 0.58, p < 10
−5), bet-
ter than the In-Strength TradeRisk, the import reliance,
and the PageRank alone. After controlling for the in-
fluence of the In-Strength TradeRisk TRstr,rUS , we find a
partial correlation of ρpartial = 0.38 (p = 0.0032) be-
tween TradeRisk and price volatility. In both regions,
EU and US, there is a significant correlation between
TradeRisk and supply risk CSRr, see figure 2. This re-
sult is not surprising, since both indicators explicitly de-
pend on the import reliance and the political stability of
the top-producing countries.
Table II shows that there are significant differences be-
tween the US and the EU in the correlations of TradeRisk
with the level of protection, the trade barriers TBri . The
US tends to employ lower trade barriers for the imports
of resources with high systemic trade-risk, whereas there
is no significant relation between TradeRisk and TBrEU in
the EU. Table II also shows that the high correlation be-
tween TradeRisk and TBrUS is driven by the PageRank
contributions to systemic trade-risk, which shows that
the US have lower barriers for resources where they have
a high network-based vulnerability (and not necessarily
a high import reliance).
Replacing the political stability PSi(t) by the Re-
source Governance Indicator RGIi in equation 1 does not
change the region-specific results, as seen in the support-
ing information, table S.V. This suggests that PSi(t) and
RGIi basically convey the same information in terms of
network-based vulnerability to systemic trade-risk. Table
S.V also shows region-specific results for the case where
each country is assigned the same score for PSi(t) = 0.
This eliminates all information on political stability of
the individual countries. In this case the TradeRisk in-
dicator TRri still shows higher correlations with price
volatility than with the import reliance IRi.
To study the robustness of the region-specific re-
sults we compare the correlation coefficients of the price
volatilities of table II with results from three random-
ized datasets, as described in section IV C. Results for
randomizations are shown in the supporting informa-
tion in table S.V. For the import reliance the results do
not change under any of these randomizations by con-
struction. Results for the In-Strength TradeRisk are
preserved under the randomizations Mrfix in-deg(t) and
Mrfix in-/out-deg(t), that keep the in-degrees and both,
the in- and out-degrees fixed, respectively. This is not
the case for the randomization Mrfix degree(t) that only
preserves the average degrees of the networks. Here
we still find significant correlations between In-Strength
TradeRisk and the price volatilities that are substantially
lower than those for the real data. These correlations can
be attributed to the influence of the importing countries’
PSi(t) values, which do not change under any of the the
randomizations. The correlations between price volatili-
ties and both, TradeRisk and PageRank, are only signifi-
cant for the the randomization scheme Mrfix in-/out-deg(t).
This confirms that there are substantial contributions to
systemic trade-risk that can only be explained by taking
the entire network of trade flows into account.
5FIG. 2: TradeRisk versus price volatility for the EU and the US. Each point represents a mineral resource. The country-specific
TradeRisk indicator for (A) EU and (B) US is significantly correlated with both the average yearly price volatility of the
specific mineral, and with the composite supply risk, indicated by color. Resources with high CSRr tend to be on the right
hand side. We also show the correlation coefficients ρσ and ρCSR of the price volatility with TradeRisk and composite supply
risk, respectively, together with the p-values to reject the null hypothesis that the true correlation coefficient is zero.
C. High-risk resources
The resource with the highest TradeRisk for the EU
is beryllium. The primary application of beryllium is in
manufacturing connectors and switches for light-weight
precision instruments in the aerospace and defense indus-
tries [15]. 85% of the world-supply of beryllium is mined
in the US, most of the remainder comes from China. Con-
sequently the TradeRisk for the US is much lower than for
the EU. Indium has the second (third) highest TradeRisk
in the EU (US). It is essential for manufacturing liquid
crystal displays. Indium is produced almost exclusively
as a byproduct of zinc mining [21]. If demand for indium
goes up, its availability will not necessarily increase, since
this availability is largely determined by zinc economics.
The highest TradeRisk for the US is found for thallium,
which is crucial for medical imaging. Global supply of
thallium is relatively constrained for the US, especially
since China eliminated several tax benefits on exports
of thallium in 2006 [15]. We also find a high TradeRisk
in the US for gallium and vanadium. Gallium is almost
exclusively produced as a byproduct of aluminium, vana-
dium is often a byproduct of uranium mining [21]. We
find a comparably high TradeRisk for tellurium in the EU
(data for the US is withheld to avoid disclosing propri-
etary company data). Tellurium is mined as a byproduct
of copper and is critical for manufacturing solar panels
[15].
In general we find higher TradeRisk values in the EU
than in the US, see table S.III. The highest value of
TradeRisk in the EU is 0.44 for beryllium, whereas its
maximum is 0.19 for thallium in the US.
The TradeRisk Rank for individual resources is pre-
sented for the EU and US in figure 3. Each resource
is ranked according to its TradeRisk values in the EU
and US. The lowest rank corresponds to the highest
TradeRisk, the highest rank to the lowest. Colors in fig-
ure 3 indicate whether the resources are categorized as
(i) major metals (ii) byproducts of major metals, or (iii)
other resources [14]. There is a tendency that those min-
erals that have relatively high TradeRisk in both coun-
tries tend to be mined as byproducts, whereas major met-
als have TradeRisks of intermediate values.
III. DISCUSSION
The essence of this study is that we have shown that
the international trading network of critical resources
contains information that is able to explain a large frac-
tion of the price volatility of these resources. This
information is quantified by a systemic risk measure,
TradeRisk. The correlation between TradeRisk and price
volatility is substantially higher in the EU than in the
US. This finding coincides with two other facts. First,
the network-based contributions to systemic trade-risk
are lower in the US, with 38% of explained price volatil-
ity, than in the EU, where they explain 68% of price
volatility after controlling for non-network effects. Sec-
ondly, the US systematically employs lower trade bar-
riers for resources of high systemic trade-risk and high
network-based vulnerability, whereas there are no such
measures employed by the EU. There is thus reason to
assume that lower trade barriers for systemically risky
resources reduce the impact of cascading supply shocks
on the prices of resources. These findings indicate that
at present there exist significant shortcomings in the risk
management of non-fuel mineral resources, in particular
in the EU. This arises because systemic failure due to
cumulative effects of cascading shocks on an intricately
interconnected system is not taken into account. This
is particularly salient in the light of the discovery that
6FIG. 3: Ranks of TradeRisk in the EU and US. Each point represents a single resource. Rank 1 is given to the resource with
the highest TradeRisk in the given region, rank 2 for the second highest TradeRisk, and so on. Resources where information is
only available for either the EU or the US are shown outside the plot area. Major metals are shown by black boxes, minerals
that are byproducts are shown as gray circles, other minerals as light-gray diamonds. It is clearly visible that those minerals
that have a high TradeRisk in both regions are mined as byproducts, whereas the major metals exhibit intermediate values of
TradeRisk.
many of the resources most susceptible to systemic risk
are only produced as byproducts and play a crucial role
in industries vital to national interests.
A number of policy implications emerge from this anal-
ysis of systemic trade-risk. While trade in commodities
or critical resources will always involve some degree of
imperfect information, better monitoring and data trans-
parency are needed to adopt a more robust approach to
understanding risks that can be foreseen by taking net-
work effects into account. Policy instruments capable
of mitigating systemic risk would allow decision-makers
to implement measures such as strategic physical re-
serves and trade regulations that mitigate market volatil-
ity while ensuring physical supply. In financial networks
it has been shown that systemic financial risk can be al-
most completely eliminated by means of a so-called ‘sys-
temic risk tax’ [22]. This is a macroprudential regulation
approach where a levy is placed on systemically risky fi-
nancial transactions to offset the systemic risk increase
associated with that transaction. Motivated by this ap-
proach, it is conceivable that similar policy measures,
such as a commodity risk tax, can be developed with the
aim to create more resilient markets of commodities that
are essential to our society.
IV. DATA AND METHODS
A. Minerals trade data
The minerals included in this study are taken from the
annually published Mineral commodity summaries from
the USGS [15]. These summaries contain information on
industry structure, salient statistics, and world produc-
tion and resources for 71 mineral commodities. The sum-
maries also list tariff codes for each mineral in the Har-
monized System (HS) classification. We collected trade
data for tariff codes for each commodity as provided by
the UN Comtrade data, spanning the years 2000-2012
[23]. Tariff codes that are not specific to a particular
resource, such as the code 2530.90 (‘other mineral sub-
stances’), are excluded. We included all countries for
which trade data for any of the minerals exists in any of
7these years. This amounts to 107 countries. Trade flows
between country i and country j in the resource r in year
t are recorded in the matrix Mrij(t). M
r
ij(t) is the value
of resource r measured in USD that flows from country i
to j.
For each trade flow there should exist two records in
the data, one for the importing country j, and one for the
exporting country i. Due to incompleteness of the data
in some cases these two entries do not match. Mrij(t) is
defined as the larger value of these two entries. Mrij(t) is
a time-dependent multiplex network in which the nodes
correspond to countries and where each network layer is
the international trade network of a given mineral r. In a
similar manner we construct the multiplex Krij(t), where
each entry corresponds to the trade flow of resource r
from country i to j in year t, as measured in kg. We
only include trade flows that make up more than one
percent of a country’s imports, i.e. trade flows where
Mrij(t)∑
iM
r
ij(t)
> 0.01 holds.
Price and volatility. The price for resource r as
measured in USD/kg in country i, pi(r, t), is obtained
from the trade data as pi(r, t) =
∑
jM
r
ij(t)∑
j K
r
ij(t)
. pi(r, t)
corresponds to the average free-on-board value of re-
source r in country i, that is, the transaction value of
the goods and the value of services performed to deliver
the goods to the border of the exporting country. The
logarithmic annual return on resource r in country i is
vi(r, t) = log
(
pi(r,t)
pi(r,t−1)
)
. The volatility of resource r in
country i, σri , is the standard deviation of vi(r, t), com-
puted over the time-span t ∈ [2000, 2012].
Total trade volume and reserves. The total trade
volume of a resource r in year t, TTV (r, t), is the sum
over all trade flows measured in kg, i.e. TTV (r, t) =∑
i,j K
r
ij(t). Estimates for the available reserves of a min-
eral r, Rr, are taken from the latest estimates from the
USGS [15]. These estimates give the future supply of
identified and currently undiscovered resources that are
economically extractable, taking into account also recy-
cled resources.
B. Import reliance, supply risk and trade barriers
Import reliance. The vulnerability of a country i
to supply shocks in resource r is strongly related to the
net import reliance of i on r. If i is a net exporter of
r then i will be affected less by supply shocks than a
country where the economy relies on imports of resource
r. The level of import reliance is quantified by the im-
port reliance indicator IRri (t), for country i on resource
r in year t. For the US data on IRri (t) is provided by
the USGS on an annual basis, and is defined as the im-
ports minus exports. plus adjustments for government
and industry stock exchanges [15]. IRri is measured as a
percentage of this apparent consumption, averaged over a
time-span t ∈ [2000, 2012]. Values for the import reliance
of the EU are available from the European Commission
(EC) [24] for the year 2006.
Composite supply risk. There exist various ways to
quantify the supply risk for resources. The (US) National
Research Council (NRC) provides estimates of supply
risks for 11 minerals based on import reliance, concen-
tration of production of the resource, and substitutabil-
ity [25]. The British Geological Survey (BGS) publishes
supply risk indicators for 41 minerals taking into account
their scarcity, production concentration, reserve distri-
bution, recycling rate, substitutability, and governance
aspects of the top-producing and reserve-hosting nations
[26]. The EC releases supply risk indicators for 41 materi-
als based on production concentration, political stability
of the producing countries, as well as substitutability and
recycling of the materials [24]. We rescale each of these
three lists of values such that the mineral with the high-
est supply risk is assigned a value of one, and the lowest
supply risk is assigned a value of zero. The composite
supply risk for mineral r, CSRr, is defined as the aver-
age over the rescaled supply risks provided from NRC,
BGS, and the EC. Note that while the individual supply
risk indicators are often region-specific, we regard the
composite supply risk CSRr as a global indicator.
Trade barriers. The trade barriers TBri are defined
as the average value of all ad-valorem equivalent tariffs
per unit applied to all trade flows into region i that in-
volve resource r, as obtained from the MAcMap database
[27].
C. Randomized data sets
To investigate the robustness of our results we con-
sider three different randomizations of the trade flow
matrix Mr(t). The randomization Mrfix degree(t) is ob-
tained as a random permutation of all elements of Mr(t).
That is, each trade flow in Mr(t) is assigned a new im-
porting and exporting country that is chosen at random
from all countries. Mrfix degree(t) has the same average
degree and total trade volume as Mr(t) but is other-
wise completely randomized. The second randomization,
Mrfix in-deg(t), is obtained from M
r(t) by replacing the
exporting country for each trade flow by a randomly
chosen country. This randomization procedure preserves
not only the average degree and the trade volume, but
also the in-strength and in-degree of each country. Net-
work properties that involve nearest neighbors of a node,
such as eigenvalues, may change under this randomiza-
tion. In the third randomization we construct the trade
flow matrix Mrfix in-/out-deg(t) in the following way. Let
Lr(t) be the set of links (i.e. non-zero trade flows) in
Mr(t) and W r(t) the corresponding set of link weights.
Mrfix in-/out-deg(t) is obtained by keeping L
r(t) fixed and
by replacing W r(t) by a random permutation of its el-
ements. Mr(t) and Mrfix in-/out-deg(t) only differ by the
volumes of the non-zero trade flows.
8All results involving randomized data are averaged
over 100 independent realizations of the randomization
procedure.
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9TABLE III: Network-based properties, supply risk, and indicators obtained from trade data for 71 non-fuel mineral resources.
For each resource r the values of the composite supply risk CSRr, the exponential scarcity Sr, total trade volume TTV r,
average degree k¯r, the largest eigenvalue λr (inverse resilience), the size of the largest strongly connected component SCCr,
and the TradeRisk for EU and US, TRrEU and TR
r
US , are shown.
global local
Mineral r CSRr exp(Sr) TTV r k¯r λr SCCr TRrEU TR
r
US
Aluminium 0.06 5.3 109 6.7 0.46 0.20 0.021 0.0037
Antinomy 0.71 3.7 10−5 6.7 107 4.8 0.57 0.16 0.076 0.029
Arsenic 0.63 3.4 10−6 3.0 106 2.3 0.33 0.082 0.041
Asbestos 4.8 10−5 5.3 108 1.6 0.54 0.089 0.060
Barite 0.53 0.0016 5.5 108 5.0 0.41 0.13 0.0047 0.010
Bauxite 1 5.9 10−4 1.6 1010 5.2 0.42 0.099 0.022 0.0097
Beryllium 0.49 2.7 10−5 4.0 105 1.6 0.25 0.063 0.44 0.045
Bismuth 0.90 2.6 10−5 8.2 106 3.6 0.45 0.11 0.082
Boron 0.10 0.0041 8.6 108 6.0 0.46 0.093 0.021 0
Cadmium 0.46 2.4 10−5 1.2 107 3.4 0.42 0.16 0.0052
Cement 8.1 1010 6.1 0.45 0.30 4.5 10−4
Chromium 0.24 0.0056 2.7 109 5.3 0.54 0.11 0.023 0.071
Cobalt 0.42 1.9 10−5 1.4 108 5.9 0.31 0.083 0.11 0.060
Copper 0.0062 0.0089 6.1 109 5.7 0.52 0.18 0.027 0.0034
Diamond 0.37 0.0014 1.1 106 5.1 0.50 0.10 0.053
Feldspar 0.021 2.9 109 3.4 0.63 0.16 4.8 10−5
Fluorspar 0.40 8.8 10−5 2.1 107 3.7 0.39 0.12 0.024 0.070
Gallium 0.60 8.8 107 4.9 0.43 0.11 0.094
Germanium 0.65 2.5 107 4.9 0.36 0.12 0.097 0.086
Gold 0.27 3.3 10−4 1.8 107 4.2 0.42 0.22 2.5 10−4
Graphite 0.49 3.4 108 4.6 0.41 0.089 0.082 0.055
Gypsum 0.049 1.1 1010 3.6 0.47 0.17 6.0 10−4 2.4 10−4
Helium 0.0031 2.3 107 4.7 0.51 0.080 0
Titanium 0.14 3.9 10−4 2.6 109 3.3 0.44 0.12 0.12 0.022
Indium 0.57 5.9 106 3.7 0.42 0.12 0.27 0.10
Iodine 1.5 10−6 1.1 107 5.6 0.35 0.095 0.0095
Iron Ore 0.11 2.3 3.9 1011 2.9 0.58 0.12 0.059 0.0046
Iron and Steel 1.0 1010 5.5 0.50 0.13 0.0064
Iron Scrap 4.7 1010 6.0 0.50 0.27 0
Iron Slag 7.2 109 3.2 0.53 0.23 9.8 10−4
Kyanite 2.6 108 3.8 0.37 0.10 0
Lead 0.37 0.014 1.3 109 4.5 0.58 0.19 0.0047
Lime 0.13 1.9 109 4.3 0.41 0.20 0.014 1.0 10−5
Lithium 0.31 2.3 10−6 2.9 107 4.0 0.41 0.037 0.031 0.0062
Manganese 0.33 0.010 5.9 109 5.9 0.38 0.13 0.046 0.091
Mercury 2.2 10−5 2.1 106 3.2 0.35 0.12 0.011
Mica (Sheet) 0.83 3.8 107 6.5 0.39 0.085 0.028
Molybdenum 0.45 0.0061 6.7 107 5.5 0.48 0.12 0.12 0
Nickel 0.20 1.0 10−5 7.5 108 5.3 0.33 0.072 0.063 0.0089
Niobium 0.63 2.5 10−5 1.1 108 3.9 0.42 0.095 0.049 0.084
Nitrogen 1.6 1010 6.7 0.54 0.17 0.0075
Peat 3.8 10−4 4.5 109 5.6 0.31 0.11 0.0033
Perlite 0.028 0.012 1.2 109 4.3 0.55 0.12 0.0075 0.0023
Phosphate Rock 1.9 10−4 1.3 1010 2.5 0.59 0.12 0.0010
Platinum 0.80 9.6 10−8 6.4 106 4.2 0.37 0.066 0.11 0.018
Potash 0.0037 2.2 1010 5.5 0.42 0.12 0.013
Pumice 9.8 108 6.1 0.49 0.10 5.8 10−5
Quartz 4.6 109 8.4 0.37 0.15 0
Rare Earth 1 3.9 10−7 5.4 107 4.6 0.43 0.050 0.093 0.016
Rutile 2.4 10−6 5.9 106 3.7 0.42 0.12 0.082
Rhenium 0.26 2.6 109 3.3 0.44 0.12 0.12 0.023
Salt 2.5 1010 6.7 0.43 0.21 5.8 10−11
Sand and Gravel 5.8 1010 4.8 0.50 0.22 1.4 10−6
Scandium 3.2 107 4.1 0.47 0.046 0.056
Selenium 0.54 6.5 10−5 7.8 106 3.9 0.37 0.15 0.0069
Tellurium 0.10 1.5 106 3.2 0.37 0.14 0.21
Silicon 0.041 6.0 108 6.3 0.39 0.11 0.013 0.013
Silver 0.20 8.0 10−6 4.2 106 4.8 0.37 0.077 0.035 0.015
Soda Ash 2.2 10−4 5.3 109 4.2 0.51 0.13 0
Sodium Sulfate 1.8 107 2.7 0.41 0.055 0
Strontium 0.83 1.4 10−5 9.4 107 3.1 0.41 0.092 0.035
Sulfur 1.1 1010 5.4 0.45 0.20 9.8 10−4
Talc 0.037 1.6 109 6.0 0.37 0.063 0.0055 8.0 10−7
Tantalum 0.37 8.3 10−4 8.3 107 3.9 0.39 0.15 0.10
Thallium 9.9 105 1.8 0.41 0.15 0.19
Thorium 0.63 2.2 10−6 3.1 106 0.91 0.13 0.041 0.073
Tin 0.46 4.1 10−5 1.9 108 4.8 0.55 0.11 0.021
Tungsten 0.68 3.5 10−6 1.2 107 4.3 0.47 0.12 0.099 0.0089
Vanadium 0.31 0.0023 3.2 107 4.4 0.42 0.12 0.11 0.12
Zinc 0.076 0.020 5.0 109 6.1 0.58 0.17 0.062 0.020
Zirconium 0.27 0.0037 2.5 108 5.3 0.40 0.15 0
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TABLE IV: Global properties of the randomized trade networks Mrfix degree(t). There are no significant correlations between
the largest eigenvalue λr and any of the parameters for the randomized data. This confirms that the observed relations between
scarcity and λr,and between supply risk and λr, are indeed the result of non-trivial network effects. The correlations involving
the size of the largest component SCCr are also weaker than in the randomized data.
Mrfix degree(t)
Correlation between CSRr Sr TTV r
Largest Eigenvalue λr −0.12 0.18 0.05
Size SCC SCCr −0.21 0.30∗ 0.03
TABLE V: Pearson correlation coefficients between various price volatilities with TradeRisk, import reliance, PageRank, and
in-strength for the EU and US and for several variants of the calculations. The columns ‘no PS’ show results for the case
where the influence of political stability of the importing countries is neglected (PSi = 0 for all i). For ‘RGI’ the values for
the political stability PSi(t) have been replaced by values for the Resource Governance Indicator RGIi. Results for the three
different randomizations Mrfix degree(t), M
r
fix in-deg(t), and M
r
fix in-/out-deg(t) are also shown. Results for IR
r
i are independent
of the network and are shown only for comparison. The significant correlations between In-Strength TradeRisk and the price
volatilities are driven by the import reliance and to some extent also by the political stability of the neighboring countries. In
some cases the correlation between TRstr,ri and the price volatilities is even slightly higher than for the data, which suggests
that countries actively avoid to trade critical resources politically unstable countries.
‘no PS’ ‘RGI’ Mrfix degree(t) M
r
fix in-deg(t) M
r
fix in-/out-deg(t)
Correlation between σrEU σ
r
US σ
r
EU σ
r
US σ
r
EU σ
r
US σ
r
EU σ
r
US σ
r
EU σ
r
US
TradeRisk TRri 0.58
∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ −0.02 0.07 0.26 0.22 0.57∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗
Import Reliance IRri 0.48
∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
PageRank PRri 0.57
∗∗∗ 0.30∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ −0.21 −0.06 −0.10 −0.04 0.41∗∗ 0.37∗
In-Strength TradeRisk TRstr,ri 0.48
∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.43∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.45∗ 0.51∗∗∗
